Modi to visit Kyiv after hugging it out with Putin. Can Ukraine crack their alliance?

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will arrive in Ukraine on Aug. 23 for a historic visit, the first time an Indian prime minister set foot in Ukraine since diplomatic relations were established over 30 years ago.
India, the world’s largest country by population and an increasingly powerful player on the geopolitical stage, has yet to firmly come down on one of the sides in Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.
Modi’s visit to Ukraine comes just weeks after a trip to Moscow, where he held talks with President Vladimir Putin. The visit included a widely criticized hug between the two leaders, hours after Russia bombed Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv, killing two.
President Volodymyr Zelensky called the meeting a “huge disappointment” and “a devastating blow to peace efforts.”
Some believe that the trip is an attempt at damage control following Modi’s talks with Putin — and the warm embrace — which coincided with a massive Russian missile attack on Ukraine that killed at least 38 people. During the barrage, a missile struck the Okhmatdyt Hospital, Ukraine’s largest children’s medical center.
Speaking from Poland ahead of the meeting, Modi said: “It is India’s strong belief that no problem can be resolved on a battlefield.”
According to Ukraine’s President’s Office, Modi will meet with Zelensky, and the two will discuss bilateral and multilateral cooperation and sign several cooperation documents.
A historical ally of Russia, New Delhi has maintained its close economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow since February 2022, with bilateral trade reaching a historic high in 2023.
At the same time, India has refrained from overtly supporting Russia, likely not wanting to damage its vital partnerships with the West. The West also has not pushed India too hard to change or moderate its position. The U.S. sees India as a potential partner to counter China, which has tense relations with New Delhi.
India’s role has been described as “tightrope walking” between Russia and the West.
Ukraine, a country with a negligible bilateral trade turnover from India’s perspective, has faced an uphill battle to persuade New Delhi to take a tougher stance on Russia.
On March 28, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba made his ever first trip to the country.
“The Ukrainian-Indian cooperation is important, and we will be reinvigorating ties,” Kuleba wrote at the time.
In a post on X, Kuleba said he had come to New Delhi at the invitation of Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who had just said during a visit to Moscow in December 2023 that Indo-Russian ties were “very strong (and) very steady.”
“Many in India, including many in the corridors of power, see Russia as perhaps India’s most trusted and dependable power,” Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, said to the Kyiv Independent.
Kuleba made his first trip to India in March, ahead of Ukraine’s peace summit. Despite the diplomatic effort, Modi did not attend the summit, and the Indian representative did not ultimately sign the joint communique.
While Modi and other Indian officials have repeatedly called for a peaceful solution to the full-scale war, Western and Ukrainian efforts to get more purposeful engagement from India have so far proved to be largely fruitless.
In terms of financial cooperation with India, Ukraine is clearly at a considerable disadvantage compared to Russia.
India’s trade volume with Russia surpasses that of Ukraine by a significant margin. In 2023, estimates of the bilateral trade between Russia and India surpassed $50 billion, while at pre-war levels, trade between Ukraine and India amounted to less than $3.5 billion.
“India continues to rely heavily on Russian arms and Russian energy,” Kugelman said.
Russia emerged as the top supplier of oil to India in 2023, beating out Middle Eastern countries like Iraq which had previously been India’s main source of oil. In 2021, Russia was India’s 6th largest supplier.
India has also taken advantage of Western sanctions on Russian oil by importing crude, refining it, and then at times selling it back to Europe and the U.S. The arrangement has been mutually beneficial, providing Russia with much-needed cash for its war machine while also allowing India to develop its refined export industry.
“India’s view is that it gets important products (from Russia) at a price point that it is unable to get from other countries,” said Kugelman.
Deputy Foreign Minister Iryna Borovets said in an interview in February 2024 that India “represents the voices of the Global South… and it’s very important that India could lead by example.”
Kuleba offered a glimpse at what tangible benefits India could obtain from increasing ties with Ukraine in an interview with the Financial Times (FT) published in March.
“After the war, Ukraine will probably become the largest construction site in the world, and Indian companies are welcome to participate in the recovery,” Kuleba said.
Kuleba also said that Ukraine is seeking to “restore trade” with India, including growth in Ukrainian agricultural exports to India and the import of Indian machinery.
Following his meeting with Jaishankar, Kuleba wrote on March 29 that the two ministers “agreed to restore the level of cooperation between our countries that existed prior to the full-scale war” but did not identify any specific steps.
Similarly, Jaishankar said that the “discussions focused on the ongoing conflict and its wider ramifications” and that he and Kuleba “reiterated our commitment to strengthen the overall relationship, including bilateral cooperation.”
No concrete agreements were listed.
Ukraine can offer India “tech resources and solid higher education institutions, especially for medical school,” said Kugelman. Around 19,000 Indian students were studying in Ukraine in 2021, the vast majority of whom left in the immediate aftermath of the full-scale war and have not returned.
But these simply do not stack up to the critical supplies of arms and energy India receives from Russia.
India currently seems content to play both sides.
The Indian newspaper The Hindu wrote in February 2024 that the government’s largely neutral position has been a “major success.”
Even after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi became one of the only democratically elected leaders to congratulate Russian President Vladimir Putin on his “victory” in the sham presidential election earlier in March, ties with the West have largely remained unaffected.
Just days before his meeting with Kuleba, Jaishankar described India’s relations with Russia in purely pragmatic terms.
“So, tell me has Russia helped us or harmed us? Has Russia, at crucial moments, contributed or obstructed?” Jaishankar said in Singapore on March 25.
“So, if I do my calculations from my perspective and my experiences, I will get the answer – and the answer in this case is that Russia is a country with which we have always had a positive relationship.”
Nonetheless, Kuleba said that India’s close ties with Russia are the remnants of a “Soviet legacy” that is “evaporating.”
In standing by Russia, India is neglecting the threat emanating from China, Kuleba added.
Russia has become increasingly reliant on China since the beginning of the full-scale war, which “increases the leverage China is able to exert over Russia,” Kugelman told the Kyiv Independent.
“The fear for New Delhi is that Beijing could try to pressure Russia to do things that could work against India’s interests.”
As much as India would likely prefer the war not to impact its pragmatic approach to relations with Russia, there are several related factors that could hinder their continued partnership.
Even as India’s purchase of Russian oil has significantly increased in the past two years, there are signs that Western sanctions targeting the Russian energy industry may threaten continued exports to India.
Reuters reported in February 2024 that the stepped-up enforcement of the Western-imposed $60 price cap on Russian oil could “complicate efforts by Indian state refiners to secure annual supply deals.”
Despite that, India overtook China as the world’s largest importer of Russian oil in July as Chinese refiners bought less due to lower profit margins from fuel production, Reuters reported on Aug. 22, citing a comparison of import data.
Yet, Western sanctions against Russia have created payment issues that delay the delivery of Russian oil to India.
Following the recent spate of drone strikes against Russian oil refineries and imposition of fresh sanctions against Russia’s largest shipping company, Sovcomflot, Bloomberg wrote that Russia’s oil industry is beginning to feel the pressure of Western punitive measures.
Another potential stumbling block in Indo-Russian relations centers around reports that Russia is coercing Indian nationals to join its army and fight in Ukraine.
The Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) announced earlier in March that it had busted a “major human trafficking network”  using false pretenses to lure Indians to fight in Ukraine. At least five Indian citizens have been killed fighting for Russia in Ukraine.
Following Modi’s July visit to Moscow, Russia agreed to release all Indian nationals serving in its army.
While still occupying the first place at 45% of the total, Russia’s arms exports to India dropped 17% from 2017-2022, according to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Imports from France, South Korea, and other countries simultaneously increased.
The Indian Air Force said in March 2023 that Russia has not been able to meet some of its weapons delivery commitments due to the overwhelming focus on Ukraine.
The poor performance of Russian-made weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has created further doubts in India about their quality, especially compared to their Western-made equivalents.
There is a further risk that “the trajectory of India’s relationship with Russia might change if the war in Ukraine grinds on for quite some time,” Kugelman said.
“If Russia becomes increasingly battle-scarred, cash strapped, isolated, and not in a position to produce the type of weaponry that India has long been able to rely on,” it could be an opportunity for other suppliers to step in.
Nonetheless, in the immediate term, “India is not going to turn away from Russia in terms of its arms acquisitions,” Kugelman said.
India’s historically pragmatic approach to the war does not provide ample evidence that it will soon fully embrace Ukraine’s cause, nor that it would abandon the financially beneficial relationship it has with Russia.  
While Modi’s visit is likely to be received well by the West — and appreciated by Ukraine — expectations for substantive outcomes are low.